| A fair agreement makes all parties to it
grumble equally, people sayso get ready to
grumble. Proposals on how
best to modify Social Security to ensure its
long-term viability but not betray soon-to-retire
baby boomers or overburden the young,
proportionately smaller workforce are now front
and center, thanks to President George W.
Bushs push for a reform plan. The good news
is the funding shortfall finally is being
discussed seriously. The bad news lies in the
considerable uncertainty about the best way to
solve it. Some ideas to strengthen Social
Security have been working their way through
Congress, and there are several alternatives to
consider in the public debate.
Progress
In
2000 the poverty rate for elderly
Americans was 10%, down from 35.2% in
1959. Source: Understanding
Social Security Reform: The Issues and
Alternatives, AICPA, www.aicpa.org/members/socsec.htm, 2005.
|
To convey
information about the reform ideas in progress,
the New York State Society of CPAs (NYSSCPA) held
a March 2005 press briefing. Its panel consisted
of Louis Grumet, NYSSCPA executive director;
Laurence Keiser, CPA, JD, a tax and estate
planning specialist; and David Lifson, CPA, a
past chairman of the AICPA tax executive
committee. The centerpiece of the session was Understanding
Social Security Reform: The Issues and
Alternatives, a newly updated AICPA report
prepared by the Tax Division and the Social
Security Reform Task Force (see www.aicpa.org/members/socsec.htm). Grumet, who praised the AICPA for
doing an outstanding job of synthesizing
important information, says, The dialogue
about Social Security reform is a great
opportunity for CPAs to increase the
publics confidence in the profession.
This article gives practitioners of all types a
thumbnail comparison of the plans and issues
covered in Understanding Social Security
Reform.
SOCIAL
SECURITY SNAPSHOT
Social
insurance. Reducing poverty among
the elderly has been Social Securitys major
accomplishment and remains critical to future
plans. Without Social Security almost half (48%)
of elderly Americans would live in poverty.
Although the demographics of those who contribute
to the program and receive its benefits have
changed since the system was created, all
Americans expect, and many rely upon, the
benefits promised in return for their
contributions into the system.
Projected deficit. A
problem with deciding how to strengthen Social
Security is that its looming shortfall can only
be estimated. Projections over 75-year periods
start and end at different points and use varying
assumptions, making comparison difficult. Under
the Social Security Administrations
best guess scenario the trust fund
surplus will peak in 2028, decline thereafter,
and finally be exhausted in 2042. If nothing
changes, beneficiaries could receive full
benefits through 2042, after which benefits would
have to be reduced by 27%. In 2078 benefits would
have to be reduced by 32%. An immediate infusion
of $3.54 trillion, increasing the payroll tax
rate from its current level of 12.4% to 14.3% or
reducing current scheduled benefits by 12.6%
could prevent the projected deficit.
While those assumptions are
reasonable, many others are as well.
Under some projections the trust fund will peak
in 2021 and be entirely depleted by 2031. Under
other assumptions the trust fund would not be
depleted in the immediate future and there is no
long-term financing problem.
Potential fixes. Whatever
the actual extent of the shortfall, three general
ways to improve the financial condition of the
Social Security Trust Fund are to
Reduce benefits. Across-the-board
cuts, means-testing, raising the retirement age
and/or changing the inflation adjustments to
benefits are methods to lower them.
Increase revenues or
turn to other revenue sources. Raising the
payroll tax rate, raising the cap on taxable
income, extending the payroll tax to all
government workers, raising income taxes on
Social Security benefits and/or diverting general
tax revenues to the trust fund would increase
revenues. Several plans suggest using Treasury
general funds to shore up the Social Security
Trust Fund.
Improve the rate of
return on trust fund assets. Social
Securitys trust fund rate of
returneven fully fundedcan improve
significantly only if the restriction to invest
exclusively in U.S. government securities is
lifted. But investing in private securities adds
risk and administrative costs, and large-scale
government investment in private equities could
distort markets.
| AICPA RESOURCE |
| Understanding Social
Security Reform: The Issues and
Alternatives, a newly updated AICPA
report prepared by the Tax Division and
the Social Security Reform Task Force, www.aicpa.org/members/socsec.htm.
|
PERSONAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS?
Creating personal savings accounts or private
accounts within the Social Security system would
change it from a pay-as-you-go social insurance
program to a hybrid with a defined-contribution
pension plan component. Proposals suggest putting
part of each under-55 workers payroll taxes
into a voluntary personal account, with
investment and payout restrictions. Personal
accounts wouldnt eliminate all traditional
Social Security retirement benefits, but less
money would be redistributed from high- to
low-income earners.
In a best-case scenario,
workers could earn a higher return than under the
traditional benefits plan. In a worst-case
scenario, workers could lose some amount of their
retirement nest egg. Under most proposals
reviewed for the report, traditional benefits
would go down regardless of whether an individual
participated in the voluntary account program.
All personal account proposals in the report
require an infusion of money such as transfers
from the Treasury general fund to the Social
Security Trust Fund.
Benefit offsets. Workers
choosing to contribute to personal accounts would
receive benefits from their private accounts plus
traditional benefits, offset in proportion to the
amount redirected to personal accounts. Large
benefit offsets would make personal accounts less
costly for the trust fund but riskier for the
worker.
Transition costs. Over
the 75-year horizon used to estimate Social
Security reforms, the creation of personal
accounts will worsen the financial condition of
the trust fund. During the long transition to a
personal account system, contributions diverted
to personal accounts would shrink trust fund
levels, leaving less money to pay benefits to
retirees. To remain solvent the program would
need funds from outside or significant savings
from inside.
Personal account
issues. Important issues to
consider under any personal account proposal are
To what degree, and over
what period, will benefits under the existing
system remain in place?
Will there be a safety net
for low-income beneficiaries?
How much choice will
individuals have about
Participating?
Investments?
Distributions?
Will benefit payments be
subject to tax? If so, at what rate?
What will the plan
cost beneficiaries in lost
traditional benefits as a trade-off for a
personal account?
PLANS
NOW IN CONGRESS
Presently there are many proposals for reform in
Congress. The AICPA study compares the basic
types of plans by looking at seven proposals:
Ferrara-Ryan, Reform Commission Plan 2,
Diamond-Orszag, DeMint, Graham, Kolbe-Boyd and
Smith. All but one involve personal accounts. The
exhibit on page 42 compares them. For more detail
readers are urged to consult Understanding
Social Security Reform: The Issues and
Alternatives.
Ferrara-Ryan: Peter
Ferrara, an Institute for Policy Innovation
senior fellow, wrote a paper entitled A
Progressive Proposal for Social Security Personal
Accounts. Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) introduced
the Social Security Personal Savings and
Prosperity Act of 2004 (HR 4851), an almost
identical plan to Ferraras. Under it, all
workers at least 55 in the year following
enactment would receive benefits under the
current system. Workers under 55 could elect to
have some payroll taxes redirected to personal
accounts. Funds deposited in those accounts would
be automatically invested in a three-tier
investment process. If market performance fell
short, the federal government would make up the
difference. Diverting funds to the new accounts
would have a significant impact on the Social
Security Trust Fund, which would become insolvent
in 2015 instead of 2042.
Reform Commission Plan
2 (Model 2): In 2001 President Bush charged
a commission to come up with a plan to restore
Social Security to a sound footing while making
personal savings accounts available to younger
workers who want them. In its report, the
commission presented three alternative models.
Model 2, which attracted the most interest,
includes voluntary personal accounts, but on a
smaller scale than Ferrara-Ryan. It includes
major changes (mostly reductions) in traditional
benefits even for those not opting for personal
accounts. It proposes smaller personal accounts
and reduces conventional benefitsand
therefore needs less outside funding than
Ferrara-Ryan.
Diamond-Orszag: Peter
Diamond, an economics professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Peter
Orszag, an economist and Brookings Institution
senior fellow (and former special assistant to
President Clinton), described their plan in Saving
Social Security: a Balanced Approach
(Brookings: 2004). It does not include personal
accounts and does not require outside funds to
remain solvent. Instead of financing a transition
to personal accounts, the plan would finance
approximately two-thirds of the current Social
Security unfunded liability through payroll tax
increases and the remaining one-third through
benefit reductions targeted at higher-income
workers. Over the 75-year horizon the payroll tax
rate would gradually increase from the current
12.4% to 15.4%. Payments to beneficiaries would
gradually increase by 16.5%, less than under
current law.
DeMint: Rep. Jim
DeMint (R-S.C.) introduced the Social Security
Savings Act of 2003 (HR 3177). Similar to
Ferrara-Ryan, it uses large personal accounts and
requires large transfers from the Treasury
general fund. It does not cut traditional Social
Security benefits other than redirecting payments
to personal accounts. Under DeMint, no one over
age 55 when the plan is implemented would be
affected. All other workers would automatically
be enrolled but permitted to withdraw. On average
5.1% of earnings would be redirected to personal
accounts.
Graham: Sen.
Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) introduced the Social
Security Solvency and Modernization Act of 2003
(S. 1878), which would reduce scheduled benefits,
largely by changing from wage indexing to price
indexing. Under this plan, current retirees,
workers 55 and older and persons with
disabilities would remain in todays system
with no changes. Workers 54 and younger would
have the option of putting 4% of wages into
personal accounts, up to $1,300 annually. The
government would guarantee currently scheduled
benefits to workers not electing personal
accounts in return for their paying an additional
2% tax on their wages into Social Security. The
additional tax would increase over time.
Kolbe-Boyd: Reps.
Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.) and Allen Boyd (D-Fla.)
introduced the Bipartisan Retirement Security Act
of 2004 (HR 3821). This plan reduces Social
Security benefits by changing the method of
adjusting for inflation, gradually increasing the
normal retirement age and increasing the income
cap on Social Security payroll taxes. In 2006,
workers under age 55 could redirect 3% of their
first $10,000 of earnings and 2% of their
remaining earnings below the wage cap (currently
$90,000, but it is indexed for inflation) to
individual accounts. Contributions would be
invested, under each workers direction, in
federally administered individual security
accounts, similar to the Federal Employees
Thrift Savings Plan.
Smith: Rep. Nick
Smith (R-Mich.) introduced the Social Security
Solvency Act of 2003 (HR 3055), which would
permit workers to elect to redirect 2.5% of their
pay to personal accounts in each year until 2025,
and 2.75% from 2026 to 2038. The contribution
rate would increase from 2.75% in 2038 to 8% in
2068. Workers could choose options with
stock-to-bond ratios of 40/60 or 80/20, or the
money would otherwise go into a default portfolio
of 60% common stock and 40% corporate bonds. Once
an account balance reached $2,500, the worker
could invest in a range of mutual funds that
replicated several broad-based indices of
securities and did not involve high investor
risks. Certain low-income earners could receive a
subsidy credit of up to $300 to their personal
accounts.
| Summary
Outline Comparison of Seven Social
Security Reform Bills to Current Law.* |
| |
Current law (2003
assumptions) |
Ferrara-Ryan (w/o
payroll tax cut) |
Reform Commission
Plan 2 |
Diamond-
Orszag |
DeMint |
Graham |
Kolbe-Boyd |
Smith |
| General
features: |
| Change in structure
of traditional benefits |
|
No |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
| Payroll tax
increase |
|
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
| Personal
accounts |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
| Features
of personal accounts: |
| Annual contributions
(percentage of payroll) |
|
(Large)
10% of 1st $10,000 5% of other
(6.4% average) |
(Small)
4%, up to $1,000 |
|
(Large) Sliding
scale from 8% to 3% (5.1%
average) |
(Small) 4%, up to
$1,300 |
(Medium) 3% of 1st
$10,000; 2% of other |
(Medium) 2.5%
through 2025; 2.75% for
20252038 |
| Investmentindividual
accounts, centrally administered? |
|
Yes |
|
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
| Minimum distribution |
|
Current law benefits |
|
None specified |
Poverty level** |
120% of the poverty
level |
None specified |
Poverty level |
| Cost: |
| Funds required from
outside Social Security (in
present value, billions of
dollars) |
$3,544
(about $3.5 trillion) |
$5,557 |
$2,267 |
$449
(i.e. none) |
$4,627 |
$1,708 |
$1,029 |
$596 |
|
| *For details see Understanding
Social Security Reform: The Issues and
Alternatives, pages 73, 78, 83, 85,
87, 88, 8996, www.aicpa.org/members/socsec.htm. **Guarantee of
current benefits if standard portfolio
allocation.
Source:
Social Security Administration memoranda
evaluating these proposals can be found
at www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency.
|
IT'S
TIME TO GET INVOLVED
President Bush has presented a rigorous case for
Social Security reform, and Republicans have
introduced reform plans featuring personal
accounts. Grumet admonishes more Democrats to
join the public discourse about this issue.
Being in a fetal position isnt what
leadership is all about, he notes.
A May 3, 2005, New York
Times editorial proposed adjustments to
Social Security based on Americans longer
life expectancy and income levels. Raising the
payroll tax by three-tenths of a percent in 10
years and in increments over 20 years thereafter
and raising the cap on wages subject to Social
Security tax to about $150,000 from the current
$90,000 are less expensive ways to obtain the
necessary funding. Social Security can be
strengthened without cuts as blunt and inflexible
as the ones Mr. Bush proposes, it said.
Americans are trying to tell President Bush
there are better ways to go. He obviously
cant hear them, but we hope Congress
can. Concerned citizens should write to
Congress and make it clear they want a solution
that works, not window dressing,
Grumet says.
The preface to Understanding
Social Security Reform urges policymakers
and the public to gain a clear understanding of
the issues involved before modifying a program as
important as Social Security. It cautions:
Although care and deliberation are called
for
we must move toward a solution in the
near future. The longer we delay, the more
difficult and painful reaching a solution will
become. Practitioners are in a great
position to help the public understand the plans
before us and perhaps help shape even better
ones. 
Michael
Hayes
Michael Hayes is a senior
editor on the JofA. Ms. Hayes is an
employee of the AICPA and her views, as expressed
in this article, do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Institute. Official positions are
determined through certain specific committee
procedures, due process and deliberation.
|